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Abstract
Background: The aim of this study is to investigate whether the public believes high cost patients
should be a lower priority for public health care than low cost patients, other things being equal,
in order to maximise health gains from the health budget. Semi-structured group discussions were
used to help participants reflect critically upon their own views and gain exposure to alternative
views, and in this way elicit underlying values rather than unreflective preferences. Participants
were given two main tasks: first, to select from among three general principles for setting health
care priorities the one that comes closest to their own views; second, to allocate a limited hospital
budget between two groups of imaginary patients. Forty-one people, varying in age, occupation,
income and education level, participated in a total of six group discussions with each group
comprising between six and eight people.
Results: After discussion and deliberation, 30 participants rejected the most cost-effective
principle for setting priorities, citing reasons such as 'moral values' and 'a personal belief that we
shouldn't discriminate'. Only three participants chose to allocate the entire hospital budget to the
low cost patients. Reasons for allocating some money to inefficient (high cost) patients included
'fairness' and the desire to give all patients a 'chance'.
Conclusion: Participants rejected a single-minded focus on efficiency – maximising health gains –
when setting priorities in health care. There was a concern to avoid strategies that deny patients
all hope of treatment, and a willingness to sacrifice health gains for a 'fair' public health system.
Introduction
To assist decision-makers in allocating resources between
different health programs and services economists use
cost-benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis. What
they have in common is the central role they assign to
costs. For economists, patients who can be treated at a low
cost should always have priority over high-cost patients,
other things being equal, since this allows more patients
to be helped in the context of a limited budget [1,2]. This
reflects the utilitarian foundations of modern economics
– limited resources should be used to achieve the maxi-
mum amount of good, where 'good' in this context means
improvements in the quality and/or length of life. How-
ever, studies in Australia, Spain and Canada (detailed in
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those countries reject a single-minded focus on maximis-
ing health for each dollar spent.
The present paper reports the results of a study of the Aus-
tralian public's views on this issue. It sought, in particular,
to elicit reflective, considered views on the relevance of
treatment costs, and to explore the values, arguments and
rationalisations underlying those views. This was
achieved by using semi-structured group discussions that
involve dynamic and rich group conversations in which
individuals present ideas, hear from other participants
and can question each other [3,4]. To our knowledge it is
the first study of public attitudes towards treatment costs
to use such deliberative methods.
Previous empirical studies
Finding out what the public thinks is, or should be, of cen-
tral concern to economists, since it is not their role to
impose their values on the public [5]. It is therefore sur-
prising there have been so few empirical studies of social
attitudes towards treatment costs. In one of the few empir-
ical studies in this area, individuals surveyed in Australia
in 1995 clearly rejected the idea that health services
should be provided on the basis of least cost [6]. In stage
1 of the study, which used a postal questionnaire, subjects
were asked whether (1) those who can be helped at low
cost should have priority over those who can be helped at
high cost, or (2) whether it is unfair to discriminate
against those who happen to have a high-cost illness,
except in cases where costs are extremely high. Only
18.6% of those surveyed were in favour of giving priority
to low-cost patients, while 81.4% thought that high- and
low-cost patients should be treated equally. One group of
subjects was given a slightly re-worded version of option
1 that replaced the words 'should have priority' with the
weaker 'should have some priority'. A clear majority of
70% still chose option 2.
In stage 2 of the study, some participants were interviewed
and asked about their reasons. When those in favour of
the equal priority option were challenged about their
position they emphasised that people cannot be blamed
for getting high-cost illnesses, that other factors such as
severity of illness are important, and that everyone is enti-
tled to treatment irrespective of cost [[6], p. 85]. According
to the authors, the results suggest that:
The concern with allocative efficiency, as usually
envisaged by the economists, is not shared by the gen-
eral public and that the cost-effectiveness approach to
assigning priorities in health care may be imposing an
excessively simple value system upon resource alloca-
tion decision-making [[6], p. 79].
In a Spanish study, Abellan-Perpiñán and Prades [7] asked
subjects to allocate a budget between two patients. It
would cost one million pesetas to extend the life of John
for one year and two million pesetas to extend the life of
Andrew for one year. When asked how they would split
the money, 74% chose to ensure both patients would gain
16.6 years, although this meant spending twice as much
on Andrew (33.3 million pesetas) as on John (16.6 mil-
lion pesetas). Only 4% were willing to spend more on
John than on Andrew, even though this was the most cost-
effective alternative. When the same subjects were asked
to imagine that Andrew would live the rest of his life
undergoing dialysis, 84% did not change their view. In a
separate exercise (Group 2), subjects were told from the
beginning that Andrew would live the rest of his life
undergoing dialysis. In this case only 29% chose to ensure
that both Andrew and John would gain 16.6 years (by
allocating 33.3 million pesetas to Andrew and 16.6 mil-
lion pesetas to John). However, the support for health
maximisation was still weak, with only 27% of subjects
being prepared to spend more on John than on Andrew,
although this was the most cost-effective alternative.
Finally, in a Canadian study by Abelson, Lomas et al. [8],
participants were asked to rank the following in terms of
their importance for health care and social service deci-
sion-making: needs; benefits; costs; preferences. Five dif-
ferent groups took part in the study – randomly selected
citizens, attendees at town hall meetings, appointees to
district health councils, elected officials and experts in
health care and social services. Costs were rated third in
importance by all groups except the elected officials, who
placed it second. All five groups thought that information
about needs was most important, with benefits being
rated second by all groups except the elected officials.
Information about preferences was placed last by all
groups.
Methods
To explore the public's values and reasons for attaching
less significance to costs than most economists would
consider appropriate, the present study utilised group dis-
cussions, or what are also commonly called 'focus groups'.
Research theorists, including Ritchie [9] and Finch &
Lewis [3], and others, have noted their preference for the
term 'group discussions', arguing that it more clearly iden-
tifies that when using this method 'data is generated and
shaped through discussion' [[9] p. 37]. For this reason we
refer to 'discussion groups' throughout this paper.
(1) The two main tasks
The study took place in Victoria, Australia, with 41 people
participating in a total of six group discussions with each
group consisting of between six and eight people.Page 2 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:11 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/11Informed consent was obtained from all participants and
the study was approved by the Monash University Human
Research Ethics Committee. On average, sessions ran for 1
to 1.5 hours. Initially, each discussion began with a warm-
up question that asked participants to provide ideas on
how they would advise the government to allocate its
health budget on the assumption that it is limited and
under increasing pressure, and to suggest the issues these
decisions might raise.
This was followed by two distinct stages in the group dis-
cussions. In the first stage, participants were presented
with three principles for allocating health resources
among patients who are equally ill, but who have differ-
ent costs associated with their treatment. The first and
third principles were derived from the earlier Australian
study [6]:
• Alternative 1: Among patients who are equally ill,
those who can be helped at low cost should have pri-
ority over those who can be helped at high cost,
because this will allow more people to be helped
when money is limited.
• Alternative 2: It is unfair to discriminate against
those who happen to have a high-cost illness. Priority
should therefore not depend on the cost of treatment.
• Alternative 3: It is unfair to discriminate against
those who happen to have a high-cost illness. Priority
should therefore not depend on the cost of treatment
– except in cases where costs are extremely high.
These options were projected onto a screen using a com-
puter and data projector, so that participants could engage
more easily in discussion without having to remember the
details of each alternative. Participants were encouraged
to debate the merits and demerits of decisions based on
each alternative, and at the conclusion of this part of the
task were asked to indicate which of the options came
closest to their own views.
The second stage involved participants engaging with the
same type of choice, but this time presented in a different
form. Respondents were asked to imagine they were mem-
bers of a hospital committee responsible for allocating a
budget between two groups of equally ill patients. The
cost of treating each patient in the first group (Disease 1)
was $40,000, while each patient in the second group (Dis-
ease 2) would cost $20,000. Again using a data projector,
participants were shown eight ways a budget of $12 mil-
lion might be distributed among the two patient groups
and the benefits and consequences – in terms of total
patients treated or not treated – associated with each
option. This second stage was undertaken as a triangula-
tion exercise to explore if participant responses were likely
to change if they encountered cost considerations in dif-
ferent ways, in particular if the 'opportunity cost' of each
option was made very clear and the range of options
expanded. This is described in more detail in the Results
section that outlines the study's findings.
(2) Composition and conduct of the groups
To include a variety of perspectives, a range of participants
were recruited for the group discussions. Participants were
selected purposively to include a spectrum of ages, an
assortment of occupational groups, people with different
levels of income and educational backgrounds. While
sampling was considered carefully, our study was explor-
atory, with the aim of detecting different viewpoints held
in the community, but not on making generalisations to
larger populations, and the results should not be viewed
in this way. Having a diverse range of participants ensures
that the groups are not unrepresentative, but does not
ensure that they are representative. For the latter a much
larger sample is needed.
We identified key informants associated with occupa-
tional and other groups – for example, building mainte-
nance workers, social workers, and students studying to
be teachers (see Table 1) – and through these key inform-
ants invited their colleagues or co-workers to participate
in the study. There are various arguments for choosing to
use either heterogeneous or homogeneous discussion
groups (for a discussion of this topic see Hesse-Biber and
Leavy [4]). However, following the advice of Finch and
Lewis [3] we decided to use largely homogeneous groups
as these types of groups: increase the likelihood of group
cohesion through participants having experiences in com-
mon; reduce the possibility of imbalances in power or
social status that can inhibit discussion; and bring to the
fore the degree to which differently constructed groups
Table 1: Composition of the discussion groups
Group Number of Participants Characteristics
DG 1 6 Social workers
DG 2 6 Middle-aged professionals
DG 3 7 University administrative staff
DG 4 8 Second and third year education students
DG 5 7 Tradesmen and building maintenance workers
DG 6 7 University administrative staffPage 3 of 11
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aged individuals to put forward their own points of view
and not to feel compelled to agree with the views of oth-
ers.
Groups were moderated by 'complementary moderators'
[10] consisting of a member of the research team with par-
ticular expertise in the facilitation of group discussions,
and a second moderator with extensive knowledge of
health economics who could answer participant ques-
tions and provide additional information to assist delib-
erations. The six groups were tape-recorded with all tapes
transcribed in full. Transcripts were then coded, beginning
with a basic set of codes established through a review of
the literature. Codes were maintained, adapted, added to
or collapsed following further close readings of the text.
Next, all major ideas for each group were displayed under
thematic headings on matrices of the type proposed by
Miles and Huberman [11]. These displays, in combina-
tion with verbatim quotes from the transcripts, are a par-
ticularly rigorous way of dealing with such qualitative
data. This process revealed the major themes, common
perspectives and differences, on the role of costs when set-
ting health priorities, which emerged across the six
groups.
Results
(1) Participant responses to priority setting possibilities
As noted above, we began the group discussions by first
showing participants three possible principles or options
that might be used to guide resource allocation among
patients (alternatives 1 to 3 above). At the conclusion of
this, members of each group were asked to indicate which
of the alternatives came closest to their own views. In this
section we overview the various positions taken by partic-
ipants when presented with each alternative, and the rea-
sonings and arguments used to justify or reject them.
(a) Alternative 1: Low-cost patients should have priority
Only six participants from all groups initially agreed that
among patients who are equally ill those who can be
helped at a low cost should have priority over high-cost
patients. While one respondent felt that favouring the
majority (low cost) over the minority (high cost) was a
'fairer' decision that created the opportunity of 'doing more
good', others indicated they only reluctantly selected this
as being the 'lesser of evils' and a better choice among ulti-
mately 'discriminatory' alternatives. Two participants also
added that some money should still be given to high-cost
patients 'in order to be seen to be doing something for all par-
ties' (DG 3).
The majority of participants, however, typically fell into
one of two categories. The first grouping, consisting of
approximately two-thirds of respondents, rejected out-
right prioritising low cost patients as 'unfair'. Even when it
was pointed out that fewer patients would be treated if
this alternative was not adopted these participants were
unmoved and defended their position with statements
such as: "But I think that accepts that money is the bottom
line in health care. I won't accept that..." (DG 1). As a pos-
sible way forward some participants suggested that health
spending could be "distributed fairly (equally) among
both (high-cost and low-cost groups)" (DG 5). This
would still mean that more low-cost patients would
receive treatment since they are cheaper to treat, but it
does not require abandoning high-cost patients alto-
gether. People in three groups who had taken this posi-
tion additionally proposed that any shortfalls in
treatment costs would need to be met by patients them-
selves, or be partially contributed to by patients if they
were low income earners (DG 2, 3, 5). Meanwhile, one
participant felt that means-testing might also be an option
arguing that "if you could afford to cover your costs then
maybe you should have to" (DG 3). Taking a different
approach altogether several respondents proposed that
treatment should be given on a first come, first served
basis (DG 4).
At this initial stage of the discussions the remaining type
of response came from participants who, despite being
asked to consider the patients 'equally ill' – indeed, the
same in all respects except treatment cost – searched for
mitigating factors that could override the need to make a
judgement based on costs and sheer numbers. Partici-
pants in two groups held strong opinions that issues of
lifestyle (e.g. smoking) needed to be taken into consider-
ation when making allocation decisions (DG 1, 4). Others
wanted to know the recovery prospects of patients, with
some participants willing to direct treatment to those
whose quality of life would be highest after treatment (DG
2, 3). Last, for one young, and another not so young par-
ticipant, age was a determining factor when allocating
resources, with both willing to favour the treatment of
younger patients before older patients. This second group
is discussed further below.
(b) Alternative 2: Priority should not depend on cost
Given the obvious discomfort that the first alternative
caused some participants, and the general reluctance of
most to prioritise low-cost patients, it was perhaps surpris-
ing there was not a groundswell of approval for abandon-
ing cost altogether as a criterion. Indeed, possibly
reflecting the accumulative effect of deliberation, partici-
pant opinions began to shift noticeably. When asked if
prioritisation should not take into account treatment
costs at all participants again largely fell into two groups,
but now numbers were roughly even.
In the first group were those who enthusiastically
embraced the idea that priority should not depend on cost
and that resources should be "distributed evenly amongPage 4 of 11
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pants said this alternative was "fairer ... because you don't
choose to get a high-cost illness" (DG 4) and pointed out
that, as taxpayers, citizens should "expect to be looked
after by the public health system..." (DG 4). Others indi-
cated that this alternative sat more easily with personal
beliefs that an individual's life should not be privileged or
penalised on the basis of cost (DG 1), with one partici-
pant explaining that "just because you're high cost doesn't
mean you go to the bottom of the list" (DG 3). Mean-
while, comments from several participants placed them in
the 'denial' category identified above – they were unwill-
ing to accept the need for cost-based rationing despite
Australian newspapers and other popular media routinely
reporting a looming health crisis due to scarce health
resources [12].
In the second grouping were quite a large number of par-
ticipants who, like those in the first grouping, felt that
decisions based on costs were "unfair" (DG 2), "unpalat-
able" (DG 3), and caused some participants more "dis-
comfort" (DG 4), but who were now prepared to accept
that costs should play a role in health care prioritisation.
Summing up the conflict experienced by many, one par-
ticipant remarked, "I think it is unfair, but we should (be
mindful of costs). That's why society must change" (DG
4). Participants in this second grouping discussed how
"there is a limited pot" (DG 2) of money for health care,
and that treating low-cost patients at the expense of
higher-cost patients would mean that "at the end of the
day you are treating more" (DG 6). Others also saw this
choice as potentially achieving greater good for the com-
munity, explaining that by treating more patients, well
patients could then "go out and help make more money
for the system" (DG3). While willing to consider costs in
treatment decisions there were nevertheless strong feel-
ings among many in this second grouping that life should
not be seen as "easily expendable" (DG 1), with calls for
arrangements that ensured some proportion of high-cost
patients were treated or were allocated a share of health
resources (DG 6). This issue was also raised in discussion
of the final alternative.
(c) Alternative 3: Extremely high-cost treatments
The prospect of not allocating resources to 'extremely
high-cost' patients at first generated emotional responses
from participants in most discussion groups. Group mem-
bers described friends, relatives or their own experiences
of battling difficult and expensive illnesses. However,
taken as a whole, while participants again found this alter-
native "not the most palatable" (DG 6), few participants
rejected it. According to one participant there needed to
be "... a line where you say 'right, anything over that cost
is extremely high (and won't be funded)' " (DG 5), a posi-
tion only a handful of participants were unwilling to
accept. Instead, the focus of participant discussions for the
most part centred on two matters.
The first of these arose in three discussion groups (DG 1,
2, 5) where respondents were prepared to accept that
resources should not be directed to extremely high-cost
patients, but with some exceptions. Returning to argu-
ments previously put forward during discussion of Alter-
native 1, participants in these groups felt that age should
be a factor when choosing or excluding patients from
receiving extremely costly treatments. In an expression of
'ageist' preferencing, one of these participants suggested
that costly treatments might be funded for "a small child
... (but not) ... people of 80" (DG 1). This idea was dis-
cussed further by a second group where respondents felt
that it was important to consider the length of time a
young person would benefit from treatment as compared
with older patients (DG 5). Meanwhile, a participant in a
third discussion group acknowledged that her wish to
treat the young regardless of cost came from an "emo-
tional perspective", and explained that "I wouldn't tell a
child that we can't give them support ... as a mother I
wouldn't want someone to tell me that" (DG 2).
The second matter that received attention, which focused
squarely on the issue of cost, was the desire not to with-
hold some form of treatment, or at least the allocation of
some health resources, from costly patients (DG 2, 4, 5).
For example, one participant was prepared to accept that
scarce resources should not be directed to extremely high-
cost patients but argued that "some funds need to be avail-
able to make their quality of life better ... at least to make
them comfortable" (DG 2). Another participant felt that
patients should receive extremely high-cost treatments if
their condition "was life threatening" (DG 6). Others pro-
posed that some form of funding threshold should exist
after which – recalling suggestions offered during discus-
sions of Alternative 1 – high-cost patients would need to
self-finance any monetary gap in order to receive
extremely expensive treatments (DG 4). Finally, as with
Alternative 1, there were again suggestions (although this
time from a different discussion group) that means-test-
ing might be used, requiring those who could contribute
to the cost of very expensive treatments to do so (DG 5).
(d) Final positions
Having been presented with, and discussed in detail, three
possible ways that resources might be allocated among
patients, participants were lastly asked to indicate which
of the three alternatives came closest to their own beliefs.
A number of participants found this task quite perplexing,
describing an inner tension between "ideal" or "utopian"
solutions (DG 3) and the need to be "objective" (DG 2)
and face "reality" (DG 3). However, noting the need to
"look at the money, not emotions" (DG 1) and the desirePage 5 of 11
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pants ultimately selected Alternative 1, that low-cost
patients should be prioritised (see Table 2). Taking a very
different stance, 15 participants cited reasons such as
"moral values" (DG 4) and "a personal belief that we
shouldn't discriminate" (DG 3) in justification of their
preference for Alternative 2, that priority should not
depend on the cost of treatment. Seeking a form of "bal-
ance" (FG 4), 15 participants selected Alternative 3 as their
preferred approach to treatment costs. Last, two partici-
pants found they were unable to make a definite choice
between the three options.
(2) Participant responses to allocating a hospital budget
To gauge if participant's prioritisation choices would
change if they encountered different hypothetical cost sce-
narios, discussion groups were next invited to imagine
they were members of a hospital committee responsible
for allocating a budget of 12 million dollars. The primary
purpose of this exercise was to ensure that participants
were absolutely clear about the consequences of their
choices. Participants were asked to distribute the money
between patients with two similar debilitating diseases.
While the two (un-named) diseases were described as
alike in most ways, participants were told that Disease 1
would cost twice as much to treat as Disease 2. Faced with
eight possible strategies for distributing the 12 million
dollars (see Table 3), participants made the following
choices and offered the following explanations:
(a) Option 1: The efficiency solution
This option was chosen by just three participants who
indicated they believed it was "fairer to treat the most peo-
ple possible" (DG 3). Indeed, the words 'fair', 'fairer', 'fair-
est', or similar variations, were used by participants to
justify the selection of all but one of the nominated
options, and was used abundantly by the following partic-
ipant when justifying their choice of Option 1:
If you don't get treated in general it's not fair to you. If
you're not treated that's not fair. You know what I
mean? So why not make it the least amount of people
feeling it's not fair? (DG 4)
(b) Options 2 and 3: Compromise solutions
Seven participants selected option 2 and fourteen selected
option 3. They felt these options offered a "fair go" (DG
5) ('fair go' is an Australian colloquial expression that
roughly means equality of opportunity [13]), through
treating high numbers of patients, keeping untreated
patient numbers low, while also, importantly for these
participants, not removing the possibility of high-cost
patients receiving treatment. In contrast to those who
selected Option 1, these participants were adamant that it
was essential not to remove the "chance" (DG 5) of being
treated or to "discriminate completely" (DG 3) against
Disease 1 patients. People in two discussion groups addi-
tionally commented on the need to treat some Disease 1
patients in order to, "hopefully learn more about the dis-
ease and get the cost down ... so that your health budget is
improving all the time" (DG 1).
(c) Option 4: Fiscal equity
Option 4 was nominated by eight participants as their pre-
ferred method for allocating the budget. This group of
respondents argued that distributing the money in this
way was "fairer" (DG 6) than the other options as it
removed altogether cost-based prioritisation. While this
option was the second most popular choice among partic-
ipants, its selection by only eight participants (or a total of
16 when combined with those who nominated options 5
and 8) was consistent with the gradual move away from
an initial refusal, at the beginning of the group discus-
sions, to differentiate between patients based on treat-
ment costs.
(d) Option 5: Patient group equity
Six participants selected option 5, with one emphatically
declaring that "it is the only option" (DG 4). This strategy
was selected as being more 'equitable' because it ensured
that identical numbers of patients would be treated from
both disease groups (DG 5), with participants willing to
accept that "it's towards the worst case scenario (of
untreated patient numbers) but doing anything else
would be unfair" (DG 5). However, not all were rigidly
committed to this alternative, with several acknowledging
they were also drawn to option 4, and one participant said
they would cease to support option 5 if the cost of treat-
ment became excessive (DG 5).
(e) Option 8: First come, first served
Last, only two participants, from two different groups, felt
that treating patients on a first come, first served basis was
the best choice among the eight strategies. This option was
selected as being closest to "what happens now... it's a
competitive world out there" (DG 5), and was the only
option where the word 'fair' was not used. No participants
choose either option 6 or 7. One participant found they
were unable to nominate a preferred strategy while
Table 2: Number of participants favouring the three allocation 
principles: Final positions
Alternative No
1. Low cost patients should have priority 9
2. Priority should not depend on cost 15
3. Only extremely high cost treatments relevant 15
Unable to choose 2
Total 41Page 6 of 11
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that, "I'm starting to see how difficult it is for people who
make these decisions. We criticise them but they are very
hard decisions" (DG 6).
Discussion
Consistent with previous studies, respondents in the
present study rejected the orthodox economic approach
to costs. In the first stage of the study only six participants
agreed that among patients who are equally ill those who
can be helped at a low cost should have priority, with the
majority finding this 'discriminatory' and 'unfair'. After
discussion this reaction lessened and support for option 1
increased to nine, with many feeling torn between a com-
mitment to fairness and the need for efficiency. In the sec-
ond stage of the study, however, the number of
participants supporting option 1 decreased to just three,
with the majority favouring some form of compromise
(trade-off). Two explanations for this change in the sec-
ond stage are (i) the emphasis placed on exactly how
many patients will not be treated on each option, and (ii)
the greater range of alternatives on offer (increasing from
three to eight).
Four of the eight strategies offered in stage 2 were gov-
erned by a clear principle – 'all the money for disease 2',
'the same amount of money for both diseases', 'the same
number of patients' and 'first come, first served'. It is
worth noting that these four options attracted less support
than the 'no-name' option 3. Although the numbers are
small, graphically they represent a hump-shaped curve
with a single peak at option 3, suggesting it was not the
laudable-sounding labels attached to some strategies that
attracted respondents (see Figure 1). Rather, most situated
themselves somewhere between the 'efficiency principle'
(option 1) – 'efficiency' understood here as health maxim-
isation – and the 'equity principles' (option 4 and above).
(1) Participants' understanding of the task
It is worth noting that participants appeared to have no
difficulty grasping the concept of economic cost. For econ-
omists, money per se is not the issue, it is the benefit for-
gone. In the first stage, for example, those who expressed
a preference for the most cost-effective option did so on
the ground that this would create the opportunity of
'doing more good' or because of a desire to 'help as many
people as you can'. Similarly, participants discussed how
treating low-cost patients at the expense of higher-cost
patients would mean that 'at the end of the day you are
treating more'. In the second stage, opportunity costs were
actually quantified and the patients who would fail to be
treated on each option were clearly shown. Again, those
who chose the cost-effective option did so on the ground,
for example, that it is 'fairer to treat the most people possible'.
Although the term 'opportunity cost' might not have been
used, it was the main topic of conversation, and was
clearly understood by participants.
It might be thought that respondents must have failed to
grasp the notion of opportunity cost or they would not
have rejected the cost-effective alternative. That is, if the
patients are alike in all respects, the only explanation for
Number of participants favouring the eight options for allo-cating a h s ital budget (N = 40)Figur 1
Number of participants favouring the eight options 
for allocating a hospital budget (N = 40). Option 1 = All 
money for low cost patients. Option 4 = Same money for 
both diseases. Option 5 = Same number of patients. Option 












Table 3: Options for allocating a hospital budget
Number Treated Options
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(All money for low 
cost patients)
(Same money for both 
diseases)
(Same number of 
patients)




0 50 100 150 200 250 300 ?
Disease 2 
(Cost/patient $20,000)
600 500 400 300 200 100 0 ?
Total Treated 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 Approx 400
Number Not 
Treated
600 650 700 750 800 850 900 Approx 800
Total Cost 12 m 12 m 12 m 12 m 12 m 12 m 12 m 12 mPage 7 of 11
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patients is that they (are irrational or) failed to fully com-
prehend the implications of their choice; that is, they
failed to understand the notion of opportunity cost. How-
ever, there are other explanations for respondents reject-
ing the cost-effective option, and these clearly came to the
fore in the group discussions; for example, 'fairness', a
desire not to 'abandon' people, a desire to give everyone a
'chance'. Judging by the reasons participants actually gave,
it was not a failure to appreciate the concept of opportu-
nity cost that led them to the reject the cost-effective
option, but a willingness to trade-off health gains to
secure these other goods.
Related to this, the fact that participants raised issues
about health benefits does not mean they were off-target.
For example, some respondents questioned not the issue
of cost per se but rather the maximand; that is, some
seemed to think the rule of rescue should apply (do not
abandon small groups of high-cost patients). Meanwhile,
others seemed to be arguing for some weighting of prob-
abilities of outcomes (which might reflect a desire for
using regret theory or prospect theory rather than expected
utility theory), and many were interested in equity con-
cerns and were thus questioning the distribution of health
benefits rather than costs per se. However, the study was
concerned with exploring the reasons for placing more or
less emphasis on costs. It was a qualitative study that
sought to know why (as previous studies had discovered)
the public places less emphasis on costs than economists
would deem appropriate; that is, what other considerations
participants consider important, and for which they
would be willing to trade-off overall health gains. Hence,
it was entirely appropriate for participants to bring up
issues such as the fairness of different distributions, health
maximisation as an objective, the importance of not
removing hope, the rule of rescue, and so on. It would be
wrong to think that because participants raised these rea-
sons for downplaying the importance of costs, that they were
questioning something other than the relevance of cost.
Finally, it should be noted that the perspective adopted in
the present study did not change between stage 1 and
stage 2. In both stages participants were asked to give their
personal views about a social issue. That is, the researchers
were in effect saying to participants: "We want your per-
sonal view about how this social judgement – this judge-
ment affecting different groups of hypothetical patients
(with different costs associated with their treatment) –
should be made". There was no change from stage 1 to
stage 2 in this regard. In the second stage participants were
asked to imagine they were members of a hospital com-
mittee responsible for allocating a budget. But this does
not signal a change of perspective; for example, from the
personal to the social. In both stages participants were
asked to adopt what Nord calls a 'caring-for others per-
spective' [[14] pp. 8–12] – to make judgements about
other people (i.e. hypothetical patients) – but to give their
own personal view.
(2) The preservation of hope
One of the main focuses of the study was on uncovering
the reasons for participants' choices. In the second stage a
number of participants expressed the view that it was
essential not to remove the "chance" (DG 5) of being
treated or to "discriminate completely" (DG 3) against
Disease 1 patients. Some had strong feelings that life
should not be seen as "easily expendable" (DG 1). In con-
trast to those who selected option 1, these respondents
were concerned with ensuring that high-cost patients are
not left in a 'hopeless' position. This is consistent with the
results of two studies of organ transplantation undertaken
by Ubel and Loewenstein [15]. The authors conducted a
hypothetical 'organ allocation exercise' and found that
participants wanted to allocate some organs to those with
the worst prospects of survival. Participants explained
their decision with comments such as "everyone deserves
a chance" and "needy people deserve transplants, what-
ever their chance of survival" [[15] p. 1052] (see also [16-
18]). To deny a person with a serious illness any hope of
a cure, even when the probability is low, is to add an extra
dimension of anguish to their remaining life over and
above the suffering caused by the illness itself. A number
of participants in the present study were prepared to sacri-
fice health gains to prevent this.
(3) The 'essential contestability' of fairness
Throughout the discussions we saw participants grappling
with the concept of fairness itself: in these cases it was not
always a conflict between fairness and efficiency, but
between fairness as treating the greatest number of peo-
ple, versus treating the same number of people from both
groups, versus giving the same amount of money to both
groups. All of these, including the efficiency option, were
seen as being fair in their different ways, with none having
ethics unequivocally on its side. It is central to the concept
of fairness that it involves treating people with "equal con-
cern and respect" [[19] pp. 272–273], but different inter-
pretations of what this means in practice are possible. In
this sense fairness is an "essentially contestable" concept
[20,21]; that is, while there is sufficient agreement on its
basic meaning to enable discussion and debate, there is
disagreement about the application of this concept in
concrete cases – to actions, policies, institutions etc. This
was evident in the group discussions reported here, where
a range of incompatible options were justified on grounds
of fairness with equal conviction. Interestingly, only the
most 'arbitrary' option – first come, first served – was not
explicitly defended on grounds of fairness.Page 8 of 11
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It was obvious that some participants found the conflict
between the need to allocate resources efficiently and the
ethical imperative to treat people equally very confront-
ing. One response to this was to shift the focus onto other
factors, such as the age of the patients, their smoking
behaviour, or their different potentials for improvement.
This was despite being asked to consider the patients
'equally ill' and 'alike in all other respects'. The modera-
tors responded in this situation by asking participants
which strategy they would adopt if there was the same
number of smokers in each group, if there was the same
distribution of ages, the same prospects for recovery, and
so on. For some participants this had the effect of clarify-
ing the task and bringing the discussion back to the issue
of cost. For others the resistance remained. The modera-
tors did not force these participants, recognising that
refusing to accept the terms of the exercise, or rejecting the
assumptions on which it is based (e.g. limited resources)
are just alternative responses to the difficult choices partic-
ipants were required to make [22,23]. However, while dif-
ferent participants exhibited different levels of resistance,
the majority eventually came to the conclusion that there
is a need to take some account of costs.
(5) The importance of deliberation
Another central aim of the study was to afford participants
the opportunity to deliberate and discuss the issue of
treatment costs, and, in this way, to question a crucial
assumption underlying the current practice of "implicit
rationing" [24]; that is, minimise cost per unit of benefit.
The course of each discussion group was similar – at the
beginning, some people rejected the relevance of costs
altogether, and others looked for ways of avoiding the
need to make hard decisions. After discussion, however,
most participants came to see this as "ideal" or "utopian"
(DG 3) and began to recognise the need to take some
account of cost – the need to be "objective" (DG 2) and
face "reality" (DG 3). We are therefore inclined to agree
with Payne, Bettman et al. [25], who argue that preference
elicitation is best viewed "as architecture (building a set of
values) rather than as archaeology (uncovering existing
values)" [[25], p. 244].
Because participants had the opportunity to explore their
own views and to hear alternative views expressed and
defended, it is hard to explain the results of the present
study as due to a lack of reflection, at least in comparison
with other studies. In particular, the discussion group
methodology allowed participants to engage with the task
in a way that aids comprehension [26-30], that allowed
them time to consider all of the alternatives carefully [31],
that afforded them the opportunity to seek clarification of
the task [32], and to construct considered views rather
than simply self-report pre-existing preferences [[33], p.
47].
Elaborating on the final point, the deliberative approach
has the potential to move participants towards 'strong
evaluation' rather than 'weak evaluation'. Weak evalua-
tion presupposes no more than that the subject be "a sim-
ple weigher of alternatives" [[34], p. 23]. In particular, it
requires no more than the expression of personal prefer-
ences, and does not require subjects to go beyond the
"self-interest" perspective [[14], pp. 43–47]. By contrast,
strong evaluation presupposes that subjects have the abil-
ity not just to reflect upon alternatives, but also to reflect
critically upon their own preferences, and to assess them
as selfish, intolerant, generous, biased, and so on. Strong
evaluation encourages subjects to adopt an 'other-regard-
ing' or social perspective:
Groups and individuals thus enter the allocation deci-
sion process, not as simple weighters expressing irre-
ducible preferences, but as strong evaluators, capable
of recognizing the challenge that certain preferences
make to our preconceptions of what health, human
nature and the human community are or should be
[[35], p. 251].
This does not eliminate the possibility that subjects might
be confused about their own values or the matters of fact
on which they are based. Nor does it eliminate the possi-
bility of ethically questionable preferences being
expressed. No procedure for resolving complex social
problems can guarantee that. However, if techniques can
be developed that facilitate strong evaluation rather than
weak evaluation it lessens the likelihood of this happen-
ing, and provides a more secure foundation for public par-
ticipation.
(6) Comparison with the earlier Australian study
The present study differs from the earlier Australian study
by Nord, Richardson et al. [6] in several ways. For exam-
ple, although the earlier study involved a budget alloca-
tion exercise, those who had previously chosen to allocate
to the cheapest patients or who had voted for a 'first come,
first served' strategy were excluded. This meant that 47%
of subjects did not complete the budget allocation exer-
cise. Also, only five strategies were available in the earlier
study, with the result that spending the same amount of
money on both illnesses was not an explicit option,
although this was the second most popular strategy in the
present study.
Perhaps most importantly, the present study involved dis-
cussion groups, with an emphasis on reflection and delib-
eration; respondents chose their preferred method for
allocating the hospital budget, for example, after in-depth
discussion of the pros and cons of the various alternatives.
In their paper, Nord, Richardson et al. [6] looked at a
number of different reasons for downplaying the impor-
tance of costs (e.g. respondents may have anticipated theirPage 9 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2009, 6:11 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/6/1/11own emotional response if they were seriously ill, or may
have felt a duty to those with a serious condition [6]), but
they are the researchers' reasons rather than their subjects'.
Despite these differences, the same tendency for people to
disregard costs in prioritising health care that was
observed in the earlier study was also evident in the
present study. In the decade that preceded 1995, Australia
had implemented Medicare, a Commonwealth-funded
health insurance scheme, providing all citizens free and
universal access to health services. However, from 1995 to
the current period the nation experienced a different
social and political environment where government sup-
port for Medicare lessened, a greater emphasis on subsi-
dised private health insurance emerged, and fiscal
conservatism gradually became a bipartisan feature of
political party health policy announcements [36]. Despite
the differing social milieu, however, substantially the
same attitude of Australians towards their public health
system arose in the present study, along with further detail
about the reasons for this.
Conclusion
The importance of the study arises from the absolutely
seminal role that costs play in standard economic evalua-
tions of health programs and services, and the importance
of public consultation. There have been a number of stud-
ies aimed at measuring social preferences for a variety of
factors bearing on the allocation of resources; preferences
for particular age groups [37-39], for the more severely ill
[40-42], for the concentration and dispersion of health
benefits [43-45]. However, these have all related to the
benefits rather than the costs of health care. There have
been relatively few studies looking directly at health costs,
despite the critical role this plays in conventional evalua-
tions of health services and programs. The few studies that
have been conducted suggest that less importance is
placed on costs by the general public than by economists.
Confidence in these studies is considerably strengthened
by the present study, which made strenuous efforts to
ensure: (i) that participant's responses were reflective and
informed; for example, that respondents had been
exposed to, and had the opportunity of discussing, a range
of options, and (ii) that they were very clear about the
implications of their choices; that is, the opportunity costs
were clear and explicit. Hopefully, as a result, the paper
provides greater insight into why the public places less
importance on costs than economists would consider
appropriate.
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